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INTRODUCTION
On November 19, 2009, Dan Glickman, the then-Chairman and
CEO of the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”),
wrote a letter to Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont in support of a
“sound and comprehensive” Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(“ACTA”).1 After eleven rounds of intense negotiation, ACTA has
* Mr. Levine is an Assistant Professor at Elon University School of Law, an
Affiliate Scholar at Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and Society, and the
founder and host of Hearsay Culture on KZSU-FM (Stanford University). Thanks
to Daniel Nicotera and Anna Arnopolsky for their research assistance, and Eric
Fink, Andy Haile, Tom Molony, Frank Pasquale, Michael Rich, Chris Sprigman,
and Peter Yu for their comments and suggestions. Thanks also to the organizers
and participants at the American University Washington College of Law’s Public
Interest Analysis of the International Intellectual Property Enforcement
Agenda Workshop in June 2010 and the editors of the American University
International Law Review. Any errors or omissions are my own.
1. Letter from Dan Glickman, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, Motion
Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary
Comm. (Nov. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Glickman Letter], available at
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been described by the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”),
the entity representing the United States in the negotiations, as
intended to “establish a state-of-the-art international framework that
provides a model for effectively combating global proliferation of
commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy in the 21st century.”2
Indeed, given the endorsement from the Group of Eight (“G-8”),
ACTA will likely become one of the most significant international
agreements regarding intellectual property laws in history, a “new
international framework.”3
The existence of a major international agreement addressing a
significant legal problem is enough to warrant considerable public
interest. Though ACTA has garnered much public attention, the
substance of ACTA is at times overshadowed by the negotiation
process.4 In his letter to Senator Leahy, Glickman addressed the
major procedural problem in ACTA―one that has nearly eclipsed
any substantive questions: the lack of transparency and
accountability in the negotiations.5 Glickman dismissed those public
concerns about the lack of transparency in ACTA’s negotiations as a
“distraction,” and he also labeled “opponents of ACTA” as
“indifferent to [the film industry’s] situation, or actively hostile
toward efforts to improve copyright enforcement worldwide.”6
Glickman was and is correct that the concern for transparency
diverts public attention from ACTA’s substance and its
http://www.scribd.com/doc/22785108/MPAA-letter-re-ACTA.
2. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). The USTR
is the government entity representing the United States in negotiations.
3. See G-8 Declarations on Economy, Environment, WALL ST. J. (July 8,
2008, 2:25 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121549460313835333.html
(declaring the advancement of anti-counterfeiting and piracy initiatives to be a
critical part of the G-8’s plan to increase protection of intellectual property rights).
4. See, e.g., Glickman Letter, supra note 1 (petitioning Senator Leahy to
support the USTR’s efforts in the ACTA negotiations and expressing the concern
that complaints about ACTA’s alleged lack of transparency were blocking
“meaningful dialogue” on the agreement’s substantive provisions); Sunlight for
ACTA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://secure.eff.org/site/Advocacy?cmd=
display&page=UserAction&id=383 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (lamenting that the
public had scant opportunity to comment on or obtain information about ACTA
despite the fact that the agreement could potentially harm both consumers and
technological innovation).
5. Glickman Letter, supra note 1.
6. Id.
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“ambition . . . to work with key trading partners to combat piracy and
counterfeiting across the global marketplace.”7 However, Glickman
understated the impact of the lack of transparency on both the
governmental procedures and the substance of the law. This article
seeks to address that “distraction” by answering a basic question:
what can we learn about the creation of international intellectual
property law in the Internet age from the secrecy efforts of the
USTR, particularly in light of the marginal use of exemptions to the
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)? Although the agreement is
not yet final, we already know that the lack of transparency placed
leaked documents and hearsay at the center of public policy
discussions, caused debates over both real and imagined issues, and
brought about a general erosion of public knowledge and confidence
in the ACTA process.8
The reason for these problems is that the USTR has attempted to
keep the ACTA negotiations in the proverbial black box; the public
knows that a box exists and that USTR (and others) are working
therein, but they cannot open it to discover and examine what’s
inside. This article observes that an ACTA black box has proven
impossible to maintain.9 The USTR’s antiquated views about what
the public can and should know about ACTA, and when the public
should know it, attest to the urgency of this realization.
In September 2009, Knowledge Ecology International made a
FOIA request to the USTR seeking “all records at USTR on the topic
of the policy and practice of USTR regard [sic] the transparency of
trade negotiations,” including ACTA.10 An incomplete response was
received in October 2009, but among the produced documents was
an email between USTR employees dated February 10, 2009,
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Appears to Figure Prominently in Wikileaks
Cablegate, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/
content/blogsection/0/125/10/80/ (discussing leaked U.S. State Department cables
referring to the ACTA negotiations and evaluating the varying attitudes of
lobbying groups towards specific provisions of ACTA and the proposed legislation
in the United States).
9. This reality is evidenced by the numerous drafts leaked online at various
points during the negotiation process. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
10. James Love, USTR’s February 10, 2009 Memo on Transparency Soup,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Sept. 8, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://keionline.org/
node/929.
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authored by Stan McCoy, the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative
for Intellectual Property and Innovation. This email, which had the
subject line “transparency soup,” included a draft USTR position
paper on ACTA transparency with the following question and
answer in FAQ (frequently asked question) format: “Q[uestion]:
What if U.S. positions evolve during negotiations? [Answer:] The
public can see how the U.S. position has evolved when the final text
is signed.”11 Without knowing better, one might view this response
as a gallows-humor joke response to a legitimate question.
Unfortunately, it was not a joke and, although stated in a draft
document, accurately reflects the dismissive view of transparency
and accountability that has been the hallmark of USTR’s handling of
the ACTA negotiations. Additionally, even if such secrecy is
desirable to the USTR, it has proven to be untenable and unrealistic,
and thus bad policy no matter how it is viewed. Policies built on
significant false assumptions naturally run a high risk of failure.
As discussed below, in the case of ACTA, the effects of the
USTR’s failed policy have already begun to emerge. For example,
because the negotiators tried but failed to keep absolute secrecy
about the logistics of the negotiations and the substance of the
agreement, they could not enjoy the usual benefit of secrecy—
namely, a smooth and efficient process―and do not appear to be
offering us better law. Thus, despite Glickman’s assertions,
transparency has become as important in the ACTA negotiations as
the agreement’s substance precisely because the substance would
likely be different if there had been greater transparency and
accountability.12 Though the MPAA would likely not agree, those
11. Id. As of February 2009, after only four rounds of ACTA negotiations, two
leaks of ACTA negotiating documents had already occurred. See The ACTA
Timeline: Tracing the Secret Copyright Treaty, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Dec. 10,
2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4611/125 [hereinafter ACTA
Timeline]. The details of the negotiations have been widely discussed on the
Internet. See, e.g., James Love, Details Emerge of Secret ACTA Negotiation,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Feb. 3, 2009, 3:38 PM), http://keionline.org/
blogs/2009/02/03/details-emerge-of-secret-acta (reporting the substance of the
supposedly secret negotiations). This fact alone suggests that the USTR’s cavalier
position was already fantastical.
12. See Glickman Letter, supra note 1 (discounting the validity of criticisms of
transparency, but admitting their continued presence and possible effect on the
substance of ACTA); Sunlight for ACTA, supra note 4 (urging the public to contact
their representatives so that there is “meaningful consultation” regarding the
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differences probably would have improved ACTA’s substance from
a viewpoint that intelligently balances the interests of all concerned.
From a broader perspective, and equally important, the ACTA
negotiations have revealed an emerging trend in freedom of
information scenarios where the government and commercial
interests, working closely together, appear to have a mutual interest
in keeping information of significant national concern from the
public. Ultimately, this article proposes that the MPAA, and the
public generally, would have been better served by an open and
transparent ACTA process that was accountable to the public from
its inception. In fact, there may have been fewer “opponents of
ACTA” as a result, and resources would not have been wasted on
largely futile secrecy efforts. Given the inefficient policy produced
by secretive government negotiations, FOIA must be reconsidered to
reflect the current state of technology in the era of WikiLeaks, and
public/private relationships.

I. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
In order to understand the context within which the bulk of the
ACTA negotiations have transpired, it is important to note the
current trends in federal government transparency. During his first
day as President of the United States, Barack Obama issued a
“memorandum for the heads of executive departments and agencies”
regarding the FOIA,13 a federal act that mandates open government
with certain exceptions.14 In the first sentence of the memorandum,
President Obama noted that “[a] democracy requires accountability,
and accountability requires transparency . . . . In the face of doubt,
openness prevails.”15 As part of the directive, President Obama
ordered the Attorney General to “issue new [FOIA] guidelines” and
the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) to “update
guidance” to the agencies in order to “usher in a new era of open
Government.”16 The Attorney General issued a memorandum on
negotiation of ACTA).
13. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on the Freedom of
Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009).
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
15. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on the Freedom of
Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4683.
16. Id.
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March 19, 2009, laying out two primary instructions for how federal
agencies should respond to FOIA requests based upon President
Obama’s memorandum: “First, an agency should not withhold
information simply because it may do so legally. . . . Second,
whenever an agency determines that it cannot make full disclosure of
a requested record, it must consider whether it can make partial
disclosure.”17 As discussed in more detail below, this is a
fundamental reorientation of how agencies respond to FOIA
requests.
The OMB took a bit more time to present its guidance to agencies,
but it did so on December 8, 2009 in the potentially groundbreaking
Open Government Directive (the “OMB Memorandum”).18 The
OMB Memorandum requires federal agencies to “take specific
actions to implement the principles of transparency, participation,
and collaboration set forth in the President’s Memorandum.”19 This
effort has been hailed as a potential “watershed moment for
democracy, the likes of which can forever change the relationship
between the government and the public it serves.”20 It has already
resulted in agencies moving toward releasing data on the Internet,
making data available for download at no cost to the user, and
disclosing previously unreleased documents for public inspection.21
Indeed, every cabinet department is supposed to unveil a “new open
government project.”22
17. Memorandum from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., to the Heads of Exec.
Dep’ts and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2009), available at www.usdoj.gov/ag/foia-memomarch2009.pdf.
18. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Director, Exec. Office of the
President, to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf.
19. Id.
20. Ellen Miller, A Watershed Moment in Transparency and Accountability,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Dec. 11, 2009, 5:48 P.M.), http://blog.sunlight
foundation.com/2009/12/11/a-watershed-moment-in-transparency-andaccountability.
21. See Miranda Fleschert, White House Announces 20 Agency Open
Government Initiatives, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS (Dec. 10,
2009, 3:50 PM), http://www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.php?i=11165 (mentioning
plans by the Departments of Defense, State, Agriculture, Transportation and others
to release electronically data ranging from updates on the Sudanese conflict in
Darfur to nutrition facts about certain foods).
22. See Norm Eisen & Beth Noveck, Why an Open Government Matters, OPEN
GOV’T INITIATIVE (Dec. 9, 2009, 3:16 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
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To understand the significance of these developments, it is
important to note the general trend since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Since 9/11, commentators have found that the
United States government generally errs on the side of secrecy.23
Moreover, there has been increased use of the designation “Sensitive
But Unclassified” by U.S. government agencies. This designation is
often found on research and scientific or technological information
generated by the government post-9/11, and allows for such
information to be shielded from public view.24 Thus, Obama’s FOIA
memorandum has the potential to scale back the excessive, post-9/11
secrecy, and thereby catalyze a re-imagination of the relationship
between government and citizens at the federal, state, and local
levels.25
Unfortunately, throughout the ACTA negotiations the federal
government has taken positions that favor secrecy and undermine
optimism for fundamental change. Indeed, U.S. government
positions concerning the commercial interests of the industries most
impacted by ACTA, as well as the other scenarios discussed below,
may reveal a disturbing trend where the government has begun to
blog/2009/12/09/why-open-government-matters (describing the White House
Directive that initiated the renewed emphasis on open government, and describing
its effect on federal agencies).
23. See Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive
Reasons: Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government Agencies, 42
HOUS. L. REV. 1333, 1378 (2006) (decrying the post-9/11 boilerplate policy of
classifying documents as resulting in excessive secrecy and agency selfprotection). This does not always mean that information remains secret, but
administrative errors are untenable as a basis of a disclosure regime. See Iain
Thomson, US Army Posted Secrets on the Web, V3.CO.UK (July 12, 2007),
http://www.v3.co.uk/vnunet/news/2194072/army-posting-secrets-web (reporting
that the U.S. Army and its contractors accidentally posted military secrets on the
web).
24. See generally GENEVIEVE J. KNEZO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33303,
“SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED” INFORMATION AND OTHER CONTROLS: POLICY
AND OPTIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION 2-16 (2006)
(reviewing past federal policies governing the release of scientific and technical
information and making recommendations to streamline current policies, including
limiting the number of those responsible for designating information as “sensitive
but unclassified” and centralizing the information disclosure policies).
25. But see Andrew Malcolm, A Little Secret About Obama’s Transparency,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, at A28 (reporting that an Associated Press examination
of seventeen major agencies' FOIA request responses resulted in 466,872
denials―“an increase of nearly 50% from the 2008 fiscal year under Bush”).
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assert aggressively the commercial interests of a private entity in
denying FOIA requests on issues of national importance. Such a
lopsided government policy gives commercial interests a favored
position over the public in accessing otherwise-secret information.
Nonetheless, in each situation discussed below, the initial efforts
to withhold information have been largely overcome by public
pressure. While full disclosure has not been achieved, significant
information has eventually reached the public, and in some
circumstances disclosure is currently being litigated. This reality
should cause policymakers to consider whether fights over secrecy
are worth the battle if some or all of the information sought will
eventually be disclosed—or, as in the case of ACTA, leaked. The
following three examples are illustrative of the problem.

A. BLOOMBERG L.P. V. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM
A startling example analogous to the ACTA situation occurred
towards the end of President George W. Bush’s administration. On
November 7, 2008, Bloomberg L.P. (“Bloomberg”) filed a complaint
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York against the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(“Fed”).26 The case involved a FOIA request made by Bloomberg to
the Fed in May 2008, asking the Fed to “disclose the recipients of
more than $2 trillion of emergency loans from U.S. taxpayers and the
assets the central bank is accepting as collateral.”27 After months of
not receiving a substantive response to the request, Bloomberg
alleged in their complaint:
The government documents that Bloomberg seeks are central to
understanding and assessing the government’s response to the most
cataclysmic financial crisis in America since the Great Depression. The

26. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 08CV-9595), 2008 WL 8066871.
27. Mark Pittman, Fed Refuses to Disclose Recipients of $2 Trillion,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 12, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=aGvwttDayiiM; see FOIA Requests from Bloomberg News
Serv. to the Fed. Reserve Bd. (Feb. 21, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/
doc/12760404/Bloomberg-News-FOIA-Request-Federal-Reserve-Board
(cataloguing every FOIA request sent from Bloomberg to the Fed).
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effect of that crisis on the American public has been and will continue to
be devastating. Hundreds of corporations are announcing layoffs in
response to the crisis, and the economy was the top issue for many
Americans in the recent elections.28

Bloomberg’s request sought documents disclosing the terms of the
Fed lending programs,29 and their complaint explained the
significance of the information sought, from a transparency
perspective:
In response to the crisis, the Fed has vastly expanded its lending programs
to private financial institutions. To obtain access to this public money and
to safeguard the taxpayers’ interests, borrowers are required to post
collateral. Despite the manifest public interest in such matters, however,
none of the programs themselves make reference to any public disclosure
of the posted collateral or of the Fed’s methods in valuing it. Thus, while
the taxpayers are the ultimate counterparty for the collateral, they have
not been given any information regarding the kind of collateral received,
how it was valued, or by whom [it was valued].30

After the complaint was filed, but before it was answered, the Fed
responded to the request in a five page letter.31 The Fed noted that it
had located responsive documents,32 but decided to withhold these
“approximately 231 full pages of information” because, among other
reasons, they contained confidential commercial information.33
Although FOIA does protect privately-held, commercially
valuable information,34 it is disturbing that the government seemingly
went out of its way to protect commercial interests in the context of
an unprecedented bank loan program where the taxpayers had an atrisk exposure of $2 trillion. For example, the Fed noted that it “has to
be and is mindful of the commercial and financial interests of
28. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 26, ¶ 2.
29. E.g., Pittman, supra note 27.
30. Id. ¶ 3.
31. Letter from Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec’y of the Bd., Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., to Mark Pittman, Bloomberg (Dec. 9, 2008) [hereinafter
Johnson Letter] (on file with American University International Law Review).
32. See id. (mentioning that these documents included reports “containing
certain information (specifically, the names of participants, originating Federal
Reserve Bank district, names of borrowers, individual loan amounts and
origination and maturity dates)”).
33. Id.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(4) (2006).
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borrowers, [and] the institutions whose collateral secured the
borrowings.”35 It explained that “institutions that may potentially
borrow [from the Fed] recognize that counterparts and market
analysts may draw adverse inferences about their financial health if
the institutions have turned to [the Fed] and, for that reason, such
institutions can be extremely concerned about the stigma of
borrowing [from the Fed].”36 Thus, disclosure would “harm
individual borrowers’ competitiveness.”37
While arguing that such secrecy protects the interests of the
taxpayer and the Fed in administering the loan program, the Fed is
asserting, in part, that it also protects the commercial interests of its
borrowers in denying the request. However, as Bloomberg explains
in their complaint, the public’s interest is magnified by the Fed’s
risky policies and the effects of the on-going financial crisis on the
American economy.38 In the battle between commercial interests of
private entities and the public’s right to know, the federal
government and FOIA have become proxies for the former, and are
being used to control the flow of information regarding corporate
entities to the public.39 Here, the commercial entities get favored
treatment by virtue of their commercial dealings with the
government, and, hence, know far more about the operations of the
Fed than the public that funds it. Indeed, in a related Bloomberg
FOIA request to the Fed (that resulted in the production of 560 pages
of marginally relevant and heavily redacted emails some twenty
months after they were requested), one commentator described FOIA
as “honorable and useful” as long as you are “not asking for
information about the bank bailout,” willing to wait years for the
information, and “don’t mind if the requested documents are 95%
blacked out when you finally get them.”40
35. Johnson Letter, supra note 31.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 26, ¶ 19.
39. Importantly, Bloomberg was ultimately successful in court. Bloomberg,
L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. Supp. 2d 262, 282
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 601 F.3d 143, 151 (2d. Cir. 2010); Mark Pittman, Court
Orders Fed to Disclose Emergency Bank Loans, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 25, 2009),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a7CC61ZsieV4.
However, as of this writing, the Fed has not produced the requested documents.
40. Katya Wachtel, Fed Gives Bloomberg the Lamest FOIA Document Ever, as
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The impact of such a partnership raises disturbing issues about the
dual role of government as both a commercial lender and defender of
the public’s interests. Policymakers must question whether the
government can play these dual roles without compromising the
public’s right to know, especially where there is strong public
interest in timely disclosure of the information.

B. BRITISH PETROLEUM AND COREXIT
In the wake of the massive British Petroleum (“BP”) Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, Nalco Company’s (“Nalco”) COREXIT dispersants
were used to mitigate damages associated with the spill.41 This is
problematic because unlimited use of COREXIT “could [have]
cause[d] unknown risks to human and marine health.”42 After
requests for Nalco to publicly release information about COREXIT’s
formula so that researchers could attempt to ascertain the potential
impact of its widespread use,43 both the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) and Nalco released the ingredients to the public,44
but shielded the exact concentration formula of the chemicals, stating
that they are trade secrets.
The exact formula for COREXIT, the use of which has been

Everything That Matters is Blacked Out, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 25, 2010, 11:18 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/fed-protects-citi-and-itself-from-foia-requestsends-hundreds-of-blacked-out-pages-to-bloomberg-reporter-2010-10#ixzz143
0hkFG0.
41. See Erick Kraemer, What is COREXIT and Why is it Still Being Used in the
Gulf, DISASTER ACCOUNTABILITY BLOG (July 28, 2010), http://blog.disaster
accountability.com/2010/07/28/what-is-corexit-and-why-is-it-still-being-used-inthe-gulf (noting that the dispersal of millions of liters of COREXIT into the Gulf of
Mexico was the largest use of such chemicals in U.S. history).
42. See Anne C. Mulkern, Maker of Controversial Dispersant Used in Gulf Oil
Spill Hires Top Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
gwire/2010/06/25/25greenwire-maker-of-controversial-dispersant-used-in-gulf94328.html (reporting that the EPA and the U.S. Coast Guard eventually ordered
BP to stop using the chemical).
43. Press Release, Earthjustice, Conservation Groups Act to Uncover What’s
In Gulf Oil Dispersants (July 14, 2010), http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/
2010/conservation-groups-act-to-uncover-what-s-in-gulf-oil-dispersants.
44. David Biello, Is Using Dispersants on the BP Gulf Oil Spill Fighting
Pollution with Pollution? SCIENTIFIC AM. (June 18, 2010), http://www.scientific
american.com/article.cfm?id=is-using-dispersants-fighting-pollution-withpollution.
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banned in the United Kingdom,45 is held by the EPA. Due to a
general dearth of information regarding the impact of the chemical,
the Gulf Restoration Network and the Florida Wildlife Federation
made a FOIA request to the EPA for health and safety data regarding
the dispersant.46 After failing to receive a response to their request,
the parties brought an action against the EPA seeking “data and
studies submitted to EPA pursuant to [relevant federal environmental
laws] regarding dispersants and their constituents, and un-redacted
copies of communications between EPA and BP concerning the use
of dispersants during the response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil
spill.”47
Presumably, the EPA would take the position that the requested
information is a trade secret and/or confidential commercial
information under FOIA.48 Indeed, the EPA would likely be correct,
revealing a separate problem in FOIA.49 But, even if FOIA operates
as an impediment to disclosure of some information, it is not an
impediment to disclosure of all information unless the administrative
agency holding the information willfully slows down the process.
Such was the case here. The EPA’s delay in releasing the
components that make up COREXIT was a direct result of the
agency’s preference for protecting the interests of Nalco and BP over
the public’s interest. Accordingly, the watchdog group OMB Watch
issued the following criticism of EPA upon its release of COREXIT
45. See id. (noting that the use of COREXIT is banned in the U.K. because of a
failure to pass the “limpet test”―where the product is sprayed on rocks to seeing if
“limpets, (a type of small mollusk) can still cling to them”). Nalco therefore claims
that the product is not intended for use on rocky shorelines, but instead for open
sea waters. Id.
46. Complaint for Injunctive Relief ¶ 20, Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. EPA, No.
10-293 (N.D. Fla. July 14, 2010), 2010 WL 2884458.
47. Id. As of this writing, the action is ongoing. See EPA Reveals What’s in
Gulf Oil Spill Dispersants, GULF OIL SPILL (Dec. 30, 2010), http://www.gulfspill
oil.com/updated-epa-reveals-whats-in-gulf-oil-spill-dispersants (announcing that
the EPA eventually released data on the chemical compounds used in the Gulf oil
spill, but also reporting that the Gulf Restoration Network and Florida Wildlife
Federation have hired experts to assess the data provided by the EPA and
determine whether the chemicals used were truly toxic).
48. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(4) (2006).
49. See generally David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade
Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135 (2007) (analyzing FOIA
and advocating for governmental “transparency and accountability” over strict
protections for commercial trade secrets).
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data:
After weeks of gallon after gallon [of COREXIT] pouring into the Gulf,
finally the public is given the most basic information crucial to
monitoring the fate and impacts of these chemicals. EPA had the authority
to act all along; its decision to now disclose the ingredients demonstrates
this. Yet it took a public outcry and weeks of complaints for the agency to
act and place the public’s interest ahead of corporate interests.50

Here, as seen in Bloomberg and the ACTA negotiations, continual
public pressure on the EPA forced the agency to release information
that it would have preferred to keep secret. In doing so, the EPA
risked the scorn of corporate interests, and legitimately caused the
public to question where the EPA’s loyalties and political interests
lie.51 But still, FOIA remains an impediment to the dissemination of
information, as public pressure alone cannot change the language of
the law.

C. ACTA
FOIA has been interpreted to exist, in part, to prevent the
development of “secret law.”52 Yet, the ACTA negotiations’ lack of
transparency heightens concerns that “secret law” is precisely what is
being developed. Here, the focus is not the power of the purse, or
public health and safety concerns, but another fundamental role of
government: lawmaking. In the ACTA context, FOIA requests from
Knowledge Ecology International (“KEI”) to the USTR in the early
days of the Obama administration were met with responses similar to
those received by Bloomberg. In January 2009, KEI sought seven
specific documents that reflected proposals for the substantive text of
ACTA.53 In a summary response in March 2009, around the same
50. Brian Turnbaugh, EPA Finally Discloses What’s in the Oil Spill
Dispersants, OMB WATCH (June 8, 2010), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/11062.
51. Cf. Mulkern, supra note 42 (discussing the role of lobbyists in EPA
investigations of companies like Nalco and explaining that because the EPA “has a
lot of leverage,” companies being investigated by the agency often employ
lobbyists who can advocate for them as a counterbalance to the EPA’s
investigative power).
52. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Privacy and the Optimal Extent of
Disclosure Under the Freedom of Information Act, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 775, 777
(1980) (looking to FOIA’s indexing and reading-room rules as indications that the
Act’s “primary objective is the elimination of ‘secret law’”).
53. See James Love, Obama Administration Rules Texts of New IPR Agreement
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time as the OMB Memorandum, the USTR denied the request, citing
an exemption to FOIA for “information that is properly classified in
the interest of national security.”54 Upon receipt of the denial letter,
KEI’s director, James Love, explained:
The texts are available to the Japanese government. They are available to
the 27 member states of the European Union. They are available to the
governments of Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Australia . . . and many
other countries. They are available to “cleared” advisers (mostly well
connected lobbyists) for the pharmaceutical, software, entertainment and
publishing industries. But they are a secret from you, the public.55

Again, while the law may support such a denial by the USTR, a
disturbing reality has emerged. Just as the Fed asserted the interests
of commercial borrowers in fighting Bloomberg’s FOIA request,
thereby maintaining the borrowers’ superior knowledge about the
loan program, the USTR has elevated commercial interests over the
general interests of the public. The result has been distribution of
information―generally unavailable to the public through nondisclosure agreements (“NDAs”)―to (primarily) corporate entities
and their proxies.56 These special groups apparently have their own
freedom of information rules. The public has no opportunity to sign a
NDA and cannot obtain the real-time information to which these
special groups are privy.57 The result is that these NDA-signing
entities and/or “cleared advisors” are far better positioned to offer
timely, meaningful input than the public. Information disparities like
this, which are fueled rather than rectified by an open government
are State Secrets, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.huffington
post.com/james-love/obama-administration-rule_b_174450.html (reporting that the
documents sought by KEI were widely available to lobbyists and foreign
government officials, but not the U.S. public).
54. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(1).
55. Love, supra note 53.
56. See James Love, White House Shares the ACTA Internet Text with 42
Washington Insiders, Under Non Disclosure Agreements, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY
INT’L (Oct. 13, 2009, 4:10 PM), http://keionline.org/node/660 (naming individuals
allowed to view secret documents pursuant to NDAs). Indeed, when KEI requested
the names of the entities that had signed a NDA and received a copy of the ACTA
text, the USTR’s initial response was to deny it, again “on the grounds that the
release of the names of persons who had seen the text would undermine the
national security of the United States.” Id.
57. KEI was one of the few non-commercial entities given an opportunity to
sign a NDA. Id.
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law, should give us pause, especially when that open government law
is FOIA.
More strikingly, this broad power of the USTR to control the flow
of information through FOIA is not an accident. Rather, the USTR’s
power is derived from the Obama administration’s choice to continue
designating ACTA as an Executive Agreement, thus by-passing
Congress and the traditional transparent format for negotiating
international agreements.58 This choice has resulted in a stunning
lack of transparency, as compared to a variety of international
institutions that facilitate international agreements, including the
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”), the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the Commission on Science and
Technology for Development, and the Internet Governance Forum.59
Aside from official drafts released late in the negotiating process, the
public has had to rely on guesswork and speculation based upon
leaked texts and rumors to ascertain the status of ACTA’s
negotiations.
Consequently, ACTA’s lack of transparency has mutated what
would otherwise have been a largely public debate about ACTA’s
merits and terms into a hearsay-laden, speculative melee. This is a
policy choice made by the Obama administration that has given
corporate entities a “most favored nation” status and limited real
benefits to the negotiation process or the public. In summary,
intellectual property law agreements have apparently become issues
of national security that require the input of commercial interests but
not the public at large. As Peter Yu points out, this “national
security” concern is “more correctly identified with the maintenance
of good foreign or diplomatic relations with ACTA negotiating

58. Eddan Katz, Stopping the ACTA Juggernaut, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUND. (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.eff.org/deep links/2009/11/stopping-actajuggernaut.
59. See Jeremy Malcolm, Public Interest Representation in Global IP Policy
Institutions 13-17 (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll. of Law, Program on Info. Justice &
Intellectual Prop., Working Research Paper No. 6, 2010), available at
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research/6/ (comparing the capacity of
certain international organizations to further the development of intellectual
property policy at the global level and commenting on ACTA’s weaknesses as an
institutional mechanism).
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partners.”60 Though negotiating partners may want to be free of
public relations concerns as they negotiate,61 FOIA has allowed
national security implications to trump legitimate public concerns
about the impact of ACTA on domestic law. In so doing, this
designation has allowed the USTR to deny many ACTA-related
FOIA requests. These denials, in tandem with the USTR’s apparent
trend toward maintaining secrecy despite promising transparency,
have created an environment in which ACTA may very well go
down as the least transparent international agreement in living
memory.
Compounding the problem―and similar to the Fed’s denial of
FOIA requests regarding $2 trillion in loans to banks, the USTR does
not seem particularly concerned that the public cannot access
information about an agreement that could impact every U.S.
citizen’s rights under copyright law.62 The issues of $2 trillion in
federal loans, public health and safety in the Gulf of Mexico, and
lawmaking about basic intellectual property (“IP”) protections have
national importance and involve close interactions between
government and the affected private interests. All are situations
where private commercial interests have secretly been given higher
priority than the public’s interest in basic information. Moreover, the
government, aided ironically by FOIA, has amplified the detrimental
impact on public transparency and accountability through its close
interactions with interested commercial entities. Therefore, while
only three examples, albeit significant ones, do not make a trend,
they do suggest an emerging mode of response to major issues of
national importance, particularly when a meaningful segment of the
public could possibly disagree with the official position taken by the
government. This emerging trend of decreased information flow
60. Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 20), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1624813.
61. Id. (manuscript at 20-21) (quoting ACTA-Summary of Key Elements Under
Discussion, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/aboutus/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/november/acta-summary-key-elements-underdiscussion).
62. See Katz, supra note 58 (criticizing the USTR for its purposefully
constructed lack of accountability in keeping the ACTA negotiations secret and
advocating for trade negotiation reform and increased Congressional oversight of
agencies like USTR).
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warrants further exploration and monitoring.
In sum, the examples of Bloomberg, BP, and ACTA indicate that
FOIA needs to be reconsidered. One may legitimately question
whether FOIA is up to the task of balancing the public’s interest with
the interests of the government and its corporate partners. The failure
to balance public and corporate interests was apparent in the
government’s multi-trillion dollar loans to financial entities, the
government’s reliance on BP to clean up the Gulf oil spill, and the
government’s close consultation with primarily corporate entities on
matters of international lawmaking in ACTA.63 More specifically,
FOIA seems to assume an ability to keep and maintain secrets about
matters of significant public concern that may not be realistic in an
Internet-dominated, WikiLeaks-prone age. Indeed, as the authors of
Millennial Makeover suggest, we are due for a reassessment of law
as a response to the “growth and success of new communication
technologies.”64 Therefore, along the lines of the Obama
administration’s early promises to make government more
transparent,65 FOIA needs to be re-conceptualized to reflect the broad
information sharing powers and expectations established by the
Internet. The remainder of this article focuses on facilitation of this
policymaking process through the lens of ongoing ACTA
negotiations.

II. ACTA AND THE INTERNET: SECRECY AND ITS
PRIMARY THEORETICAL BENEFIT UPENDED
Despite the efforts for secrecy, some ACTA information has
leaked to an eager public and, to a lesser extent, has been officially
63. The government may not have a perfect mutuality of interest in these
scenarios, but it is clearly operating as a partner with corporate entities to achieve
mutually-identified goals. The exact parameters of this balancing are beyond the
scope of this paper, but are a subject of current research.
64. See MORLEY WINOGRAD & MICHAEL D. HAIS, MILLENNIAL MAKEOVER:
MYSPACE, YOUTUBE, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 49 (2008)
(reviewing “cycles” of American political activity and predicting a “comeback” of
“activist government” due, in part, to the impact of technological development on
voter behavior).
65. See Change has come to WhiteHouse.gov, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 20,
2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/change_has_come_to_whitehouse-gov/
(proclaiming the Obama administration’s commitment to transparency and
announcing the online publication of executive orders and proclamations).
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released.66 This information, perhaps because it is so unusual to
receive, has been rapidly disseminated through the Internet.67 Thus, a
related question is whether attempts at secrecy can be maintained in
the face of an international negotiation on a far reaching topic―the
state of IP law―and hidden from a public with a robust and
pervasive tool with which to communicate and share
information―the Internet. In other words, can interested parties ever
reap the benefits of secrecy when there is a strong public interest in
the concealed information?68 Aside from transparency concerns,
which may provide a normative policy argument in favor of greater
disclosure, is secretive behavior nonetheless defensible from a
practical perspective as a preferred mode of lawmaking? In this
section, this article proposes that the likely answer is no.
The lack of disclosure and accountability since the beginning of
the ACTA negotiations has been roundly criticized. The primary
concerns have been (1) general erosion of deliberative democracy,
(2) one-sided input that reflects primary commercial perspectives, (3)
speculation and guesswork replacing real discussion of the issues,
and (4) deterioration of the legitimacy of the process and the law
being created.69 Each of these concerns has played a part in the
public condemnation of the negotiators’ positions on transparency
and accountability.70 But what about the primary benefit of
66. See, e.g., Jane Fae Ozimek, ACTA Leaks - But Secret Squirrel Stays Secret:
Fingers Point to the USA, THE REGISTER (July 23, 2010), http://www.theregister.
co.uk/2010/07/23/acta_leak_secrecy/ (suggesting that the secrecy surrounding
ACTA negotiations is potentially pointless because news about meetings and
discussions is constantly being leaked).
67. See e.g., ACTA WATCH, http://acta.michaelgeist.ca (last visited Mar. 1,
2011); KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, http://keionline.org (last visited Mar. 1,
2011); ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org (last visited Mar. 1,
2011).
68. See Aaron X. Fellmeth, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement in the
Public Eye, 14(18) ASIL INSIGHT, June 24, 2010, at 1, available at
http://www.asil.org/files/insight100624pdf.pdf (commenting that while the United
States is typically secretive in its treaty negotiations, the USTR has begun to feel
pressure from mounting criticism about the guarded nature of ACTA negotiations);
see also Ozimek, supra note 66 (opining that leaks signal the futility of keeping
ACTA negotiations secret).
69. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of the
ACTA process as lacking transparency).
70. See Yu, supra note 60, at 21 (decrying the government’s decision to
support certain industries to the detriment of the greater public).
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secrecy―namely, smooth and efficient negotiations free from
external influences, which range from “political complications in the
capitals to opposition from civil society groups?”71 Because the
Internet exists as a pervasive means to disseminate information on
issues of significant public concern, the remainder of this paper
suggests that the benefit of secrecy is difficult, and in some cases
impossible, to maintain when (1) an issue of significant national
interest is receiving national attention, and (2) there is an organized
and technologically-savvy group of interested members of the public
that are not receiving desired information about the issue. Therefore,
under these circumstances, governmental policies formulated with an
assumption of the ability to maintain strong secrecy run a risk of
failure to the extent that secrecy is fundamental to achieving the
given goals.

A. PROBLEMS WITH THE SECRECY ASSUMPTION
There are several problems with assuming the ability to maintain
strong secrecy in the ACTA context. Since information was first
leaked about the mere existence of the ACTA negotiations, concerns
were raised that ACTA was locked inside the proverbial black box.
Professor Michael Geist, one of Canada’s leading copyright scholars,
noted in an early commentary that ACTA “could ultimately prove
bigger than WIPO―without the constraints of consensus building,
developing countries, and civil society groups, the ACTA could
further reshape the IP landscape with tougher enforcement, stronger
penalties, and a gradual eradication of the copyright and trademark
balance.”72
Thus began a concerted effort to grab the most useful information
about the state of the ACTA―namely, actual drafts of the
agreement. Despite coordinated international efforts to maintain the
security of negotiating drafts, at least six full or partial drafts were
71. Id. at 22; see also EUROPEAN COMM’N, ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE
AGREEMENT FACT SHEET 4 (2008), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2009/january/tradoc_142039.pdf (“For reasons of efficiency, it is only natural
that intergovernmental negotiations dealing with issues that have an economic
impact, do not take place in public and that negotiators are bound by a certain level
of discretion.”).
72. Is ACTA the New WIPO?, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Oct. 24, 2007),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/2318/99999.
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leaked and widely disseminated on the Internet by highly-read
technology information websites, including Boing Boing and
WikiLeaks.73
To be clear, leaks are not a system of public transparency, and the
information adduced typically cannot be used to offer much
meaningful input to policymakers. Unsurprisingly, however, the
USTR did not offer any formal ways for the public to offer input on
leaked information. Though the public could not obtain a perfect
picture of the U.S. position, it was simply wishful thinking—from
the beginning—for the USTR to assert that the public would find out
how the U.S. position evolved only once the agreement had been
signed. Indeed, a week before the date of McCoy’s “transparency
soup” email, which made this assertion, the second leak of an ACTA
draft had been publicly discussed and analyzed.74 The USTR,
Ambassador Ron Kirk, also maintained this position in December
2009, telling KEI’s James Love that the ACTA text would be made
public “when it is finished.”75 At that time at least four leaks had
occurred.76 Policymaking based upon wishful thinking cannot lead to
73. The first leak occurred on May 22, 2008 and was reported by WikiLeaks.
Proposed US ACTA Multilateral Intellectual Property Trade Agreement (2007),
WIKILEAKS (May 21, 2008), http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Proposed_US_ACTA_
plurilateral_intellectual_property_trade_agreement_%282007%29. The second,
less substantial leak occurred in February 2009. Putting Together the ACTA
Puzzle: Privacy, P2P Major Targets, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Feb. 3, 2009),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3660/125 [hereinafter ACTA Puzzle]. The
third leak occurred in April 2009 and was again published on WikiLeaks. The
fourth, focusing on Internet issues, occurred in November 2009. The ACTA
Internet Chapter: Putting the Pieces Together, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Nov. 3,
2009), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4510/99999. The fifth leak was a
full text draft of the agreement and was leaked in March 2010. ACTA’s De Minimis
Provision: Countering the iPod Searching Border Guard Fears, MICHAEL GEIST
BLOG (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4900/125. The
most recent leak occurred in September 2010. Cory Doctorow, Latest Leaked Draft
of Secret Copyright Treaty: US Trying To Cram DRM Rules Down the World’s
Throats, BOING BOING (Sept. 6, 2010, 7:38 AM), http://boingboing.net/
2010/09/06/latest-leaked-draft.html.
74. See ACTA Puzzle, supra note 73 (noting that although the treaty is not near
completion, ACTA’s scope appears to encompass multiple chapters ranging from
enforcement to institutional arrangements); supra note 11 and accompanying text.
75. James Love, Ambassador Kirk: People Would be “Walking Away from the
Table” if the ACTA Text is Made Public, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Dec. 3,
2009, 5:31 PM), http://keionline.org/node/706.
76. See supra note 73 (chronicling the various leaks that occurred during the
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good law, and the realities of the USTR’s limited ability to maintain
secrecy might explain why negotiators finally caved and released an
“official” draft text in April 2010.
Aside from the basic fact that draft texts and portions thereof were
being leaked in spite of the official stance, another part of the
problem is that USTR’s support and encouragement of ironclad
secrecy stands in stark contrast to the approach of other international
bodies charged with lawmaking in the intellectual property sphere.
For example, major IP treaty bodies such as the World Health
Organization (“WHO”), WTO―which includes the Council for the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”), and the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) publish agendas, lists of participants,
meeting minutes, and draft documents on their respective web sites.77
Indeed, as Jeremy Malcolm noted in his recent study of a number of
international institutions, “even the WTO, the least participatory of
the organizations studied, posts all of its official documents online,
and most of the other institutions [including WIPO] also make
available negotiating texts.”78 Thus, the USTR had virtually no
precedent for such an extreme maneuver, and the public rightly
expected more information based upon past precedent.
Indeed, the strategy inspired Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon to
write to the USTR in late 2009 asking for the USTR’s specific
ACTA negotiation positions.79 Upon receiving a response, Wyden
course of the ACTA negotiations).
77. See Malcolm, supra note 59, at 15-17 (summarizing the strengths and
weaknesses of various international organizations with respect to transparency);
Electronic Frontier Found. et al., ACTA is Secret. How Transparent are other
Global Norm Setting Exercises? (July 21, 2009), http://www.keionline.org/miscdocs/4/attachment1_transparency_ustr.pdf (providing examples of transparency
from the policies and practices of, inter alia, WHO, WTO, WIPO, and
UNCITRAL).
78. See Malcolm, supra note 59, at 17, 20 (concluding that ACTA fails to meet
the transparency best practices employed by existing intellectual property
institutions).
79. See Letter from Ron Wyden, U.S. Senator, to The Honorable Ron Kirk,
U.S. Trade Representative (Jan. 6, 2010), available at http://keionline.org/sites/
default/files/Wyden_Letter_to_USTR_on_ACTA_Jan_2010.pdf
(requesting
information such as the extent to which USTR was considering the impact of
negotiation proposals on domestic laws and USTR’s goals regarding ACTA’s
scope).
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issued a press release in January 2010 in which he noted that he was
attempting to “shed light” on ACTA’s “secret negotiations” and
sought to “encourage[ ] [the USTR] to give the public a say over
issues that so profoundly affect their lives, as trade policies often
do.”80 The highly unusual action of a Democratic Senator
challenging an appointee of a Democratic President on a major
international negotiation, combined with the stark differences in
negotiation transparency and accountability between ACTA and all
other major international IP agreements of recent vintage, suggests
that the USTR’s apparent strategy of extreme secrecy was a nonstarter.
Despite the possibility of a streamlined process where public input
is virtually non-existent and a hand-picked group of advisors
periodically offers counsel to the USTR, evidence suggests that
ACTA has actually taken longer to negotiate than many similar
international IP agreements.81 Assuming that ACTA negotiations
began in June 2008 and as of this writing have not yet concluded,
these negotiations have taken over two and a half years. While this is
not an excessive amount of time to negotiate a multilateral
international agreement, KEI notes that it is longer than negotiations
for nine of sixteen multilateral IP agreements.82 Thus, while there are
many factors that affect the speed with which a treaty is negotiated, it
is at least questionable whether the efforts at secrecy, however
flawed, have actually streamlined the negotiation process. Stated
differently, the fact that WIPO and WTO are more transparent, yet
have been able to facilitate the conclusion of major recent
international IP agreements in comparable or less time than ACTA,
challenges the notion that secrecy inevitably leads to a streamlined
80. Malini Aisola, USTR Responds to Senator Wyden’s Letter on ACTA,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Mar. 2, 2010, 5:01 PM), http://keionline.org/
node/791.
81. See Alberto Cerda, How Much Time is Necessary to Negotiate the Text of a
Multilateral Agreement on Intellectual Property?, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L
(June 4, 2010, 12:03 PM), http://keionline.org/node/861 (outlining the negotiation
histories of major international IP treaties).
82. See id. (“[T]he time to negotiate the text of [an] agreement generally took
less than four years, and in many cases, less than two years.”). For example, the
1996 WIPO Internet treaties were negotiated in less than two years, whereas
WTO’s TRIPS, arguably the most significant IP treaty, was concluded in 1993
after three and a half years of negotiations. Id.
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and efficient negotiation process in IP lawmaking.
Aside from the questionable practical impact of excessive secrecy,
the USTR’s position is rendered even more untenable simply
because it does not meet current expectations of a transparent and
accountable government. The Internet has raised public expectations
of what transparency and accountability look like, and policymakers
ignore this shift at their peril. Indeed, as illustrated during the ACTA
negotiations, interested parties can force transparency where little or
none is officially desired.83 Once transparency is forced by the
public, any administrative efforts to realistically control disclosure
become tainted. Hence, the USTR’s largely unsuccessful efforts to
maintain black box secrecy can be dismissed as little more than an
effort to prevent the public from knowing about its lawmaking
activities.
Indeed, as KEI’s James Love explained to Ambassador Kirk in
December 2009, receiving the text after it was concluded “was too
late, and the public wanted the text out now, before it’s too late to
influence anything.”84 Only time will tell whether the final draft
reflects scholars’ and practitioners’ indirect input, offered through
the analysis of leaked texts and more recent “official” versions.85
Nonetheless, despite this uncertainty and USTR’s efforts to shield
the negotiation process from the public, this has not been a process
wholly devoid of public input. At a minimum, the public has
compelled some disclosure and forced the USTR and other
negotiating parties to defend the official policy of not releasing drafts
and other valuable information.86
83. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (detailing the numerous leaks of
ACTA despite attempts by the negotiating parties to preserve secrecy).
84. See Love, supra note 75 (describing how the interaction between Love and
Ambassador Kirk―which occurred while the two were seated next to each other
on an airplane―was reported in a number of major Internet news outlets including
Tech Dirt, Wired, Boing Boing, and Slashdot, which further attests to the ability of
the Internet to quickly disseminate information to an interested community).
85. See PIJIP Research Paper Series, AM. U. WASH. C. L. DIGITAL COMMONS,
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/research (last visited Mar. 1, 2011)
(listing numerous academic papers investigating issues surrounding ACTA’s
negotiations and substantive provisions).
86. See Love, supra note 75 (reporting that Ambassador Kirk responded to
criticisms about transparency by saying that certain parties would “walk[] away
from the table” if the ACTA negotiations were not secret); see also Sean Flynn,
ACTA to Meet Sept. 23: Locking Out Civil Society?, PROGRAM ON INFO. JUST. &
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Although Love also quotes Ambassador Kirk as stating that “the
issue of transparency was ‘about as complicated as it can get,’” one
commenter on Love’s interaction with Kirk retorts that
“[t]ransparency is only a complicated issue when you’re being
dishonest.”87 This unsympathetic response is to be expected, as here,
the USTR has employed extreme and unprecedented efforts to keep
secret a major international negotiation aiming to create new law and
international enforcement institutions on a hot-button issue like
copyright piracy. Because of its forceful attempts to maintain
unprecedented levels of secrecy, the USTR must expect a negative
public reaction once the existence of the negotiations is revealed.
Whether this commenter’s view reflects reality is secondary to the
fact that it is a logical reaction to the USTR’s unparalleled efforts to
keep an international lawmaking negotiation process secret.
The failure of the USTR to maintain the black box as part of its
“you’ll-find-out-when-it’s-done” method of lawmaking has
demonstrated its weakness as a law-making modality. Real-time
disclosure of information is both expected and key to a deliberative
democracy, and the USTR’s efforts reflect a policy that is opposed to
such disclosure. Naturally, offering input on drafts after they have
been negotiated is not as valuable as having the opportunity to do so
before the parties settle on an agreement’s core goals and terms.
While some secrecy is to be expected and may even be desirable, for
ACTA, the USTR’s secrecy efforts denied any opportunity for
substantively meaningful real-time input from the public with little
or no countervailing benefit to the USTR or its negotiating partners.
Putting aside the reality in which organized citizens have access to
the greatest system of information sharing ever invented, the USTR
curtailed democratic legitimacy and public buy-in on the laws
enacted, and its position is therefore difficult to defend.
The existence of the Internet broadly, and WikiLeaks specifically,
only exacerbates the failings of USTR’s policy. Once we engraft the
Internet, organizations at war with secrecy like WikiLeaks, and an
organized, technologically savvy, and interested public onto these
INTELL. PROP. (Sept. 21, 2010, 10:08 AM), http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/
go/blog-post/acta-to-meet-sept-23-locking-out-civil-society (describing how the
USTR has reacted to the public by starting to release some documents, including
meeting agendas).
87. Love, supra note 75.
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legitimacy problems, the USTR’s position becomes not only
damaging to democracy, but nearly impossible to achieve. Indeed, as
seen in ACTA, increased public condemnation and outcry forced
some begrudging disclosure and led to something less than a smooth
and efficient process. In sum, the USTR’s policy has proven to be
little more than wishful thinking regarding a bad idea and should be
abandoned in future international negotiations.

CONCLUSION
Going back to Jeremy Bentham and even earlier, the theoretical
bases against secrecy in a democracy have been known and
articulated.88 During ACTA negotiations, secrecy’s modern practical
limitations in a democracy have been shown. Today, it should be
received wisdom that the kind of secrecy possible before the advent
of the Internet—the proverbial “black box”—is increasingly difficult
to maintain and, therefore, from a practical perspective, should not
be part of lawmakers’ considerations in deciding how best to create
and enact law. Indeed, the mainstream media understands this point
well. In the promotion of its political comedy series The Thick of It,
the BBC noted that:
If [twenty-four] hours is “a long time in politics,” the two decades since
Yes, Prime Minister [a 1980s BBC show] now seem like light years ago.
So when The Thick of It first appeared in 2005, it was well overdue.
Secrets are harder to keep in this age of cell phone cameras, blogs and
Tweets.89

Absolute secrecy cannot be maintained, especially regarding a
controversial issue like anti-piracy enforcement in the international
context.90 This paper points out that the leaks and resulting opaque
“transparency soup”—or partial, uncontrolled and haphazard
88. See Levine, supra note 49, at 158-59 (remarking that nineteenth century
scholars like Bentham acknowledged that openness and transparency increase
governmental efficiency and help to ensure that the electorate can make informed
voting choices).
89. Putting you “In the Loop” about The Thick of It, BBC AM. (Apr. 29, 2010),
http://www.bbcamericashop.com /blog/dvds-in-the-works/2010/04/29/putting-you%E2%80%9Cin-the-loop%E2%80%9D-about-the-thick-of-it.
90. See Jonathan Lynn, States Clash over Anti-Counterfeiting Enforcement,
REUTERS (June 9, 2010), http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49179920100609
(reporting on the controversial nature of certain ACTA proposals).
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secrecy—upend the main benefits associated with secrecy,
particularly streamlining and efficiency. These benefits can only be
achieved by maintaining the black box, an outcome which has
proven difficult―and in cases like ACTA, impossible―in 2011.
A post-hoc disclosure of information―whether authorized or by
leak―seems to primarily discredit the withholding institutions when
they have not allowed for the benefit of meaningful real-time public
input at the critical point when policy is being formulated and laws
written. For example, the kind of secrecy envisioned by the USTR
needlessly created an adversarial relationship with the public that
reinforced the worst fears and criticisms about current lawmakers.
Simultaneously, leaks and official drafts were released in the midst
of the purported black box policy. This resulted in the public being
afforded a less efficient mode of lawmaking, and led them to lose
faith in the institutions involved.
Combined with the reality that governments, particularly
administrative agencies, and private industry often have a strong
mutuality of interest in keeping information regarding matters of
significant national concern from the public, it seems that the
structure of FOIA needs to be reconsidered. As economist Alfred E.
Kahn explained, when an administrative commission is responsible
for the performance of an industry, it is under nearly inescapable
pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates.91 The
agency naturally seeks desirable performance from the entities over
which it exercises authority, and tends to prefer its own controls
rather than the unpredictable forces of competition.92 As the
examples discussed in this article illustrate, limiting transparency can
be seen broadly as part of the “controls” used to shield commercial
entities and their regulators from public scrutiny, second-guessing,
and accountability. If the prevailing opinion within commercial and
administrative entities is that a lack of public input in relevant policy
decisions maintains or increases the commercial “health” of the
regulated industries, as may be indicated by the above examples,
91. See ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS 11-13 (1988) (“Responsible for the continued provision and
improvement of service, [the agency] comes increasingly and understandably to
identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it
must rely to deliver these goods.”).
92. Id.
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then the competing values and capture of administrative entities by
commercial interests is a problem long-overdue to be addressed.
In sum, it is both damaging to democracy and untenable to
maintain a FOIA that allows fundamental information about the
expenditure of taxpayer dollars, health and safety risks associated
with a clean-up of a major oil spill, and lawmaking itself to be
withheld from the public. This is particularly true in an environment
where the sharing of information is getting increasingly simple,
pervasive, and expected. While a certain level of secrecy is necessary
and even desirable in the functioning of government, as reflected
generally (if not perfectly) in the exemptions to FOIA,93 excessive
and unjustified secrecy, as seen in the above examples, is
problematic and concerning. Indeed, the ACTA negotiations have
proven that lawmaking on issues of significant national concern
becomes bogged down, rather than streamlined and improved, when
antiquated laws and assumptions about secrecy merge. This article
seeks to advance this simple, but important point, so that
policymakers can move on to the next, more challenging, question:
How do we update FOIA, acknowledging the close partnership
between government and the private sector and its impact on what
information is and is not disclosed to the public? If this issue is taken
up by Congress, the unfortunate experience of the ACTA negotiation
process might be the impetus for meaningful change in how the
United States conceives its version of democracy. We would have
fewer “distractions,” and, by virtue of policymakers getting the
benefit of meaningful, real-time public input, we might draft better,
more balanced, and more legitimate IP laws—and laws generally.

93. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006). Indeed, this author is currently researching and
writing on the blurring and merger of national security and commercial interests
under FOIA—and what technology can do about it.

